My friend Tim responded to my world of forms post, and I wanted to respond to his comment.
He said: "I fail to see how a world of forms (supernatural/extraplanar) is based on a material world of observation. Correct me if I am mistaken, but I believe Pluto was under the impression we all came from the same place and will wind up in the same place, thusly, world of forms. My true question is this; With which part of forms do you agree and with which part of forms do you argue? (As you cannot say each of our forms is different and then say you are still in favor of forms as a concept)"
So first of all Plato doesn't think his world of forms is a physical place, as you say, but everything in this world as we know it (i.e., the things we see) are all manifestations and copies of those things in the world of forms.
As far as what exactly I'm saying, I'm refuting his concept of a single immaterial world of forms from which all things originate based upon two things. First of all, he says that a thing is more beautiful the closer it is to the actual form from which it is derived. For example, one cat is more beatiful from a second because the the first cast is closer to the perfect ideal form of cat (regardless of the fact that this ideal form of cat is not material). And then my second point is that I think Plato disregarded the fact that Beauty is a subjective thing. He of course would argue that it is not, that only philosophers who have "seen" the world of forms can know what is beautiful, but I think this is ignoring how things work in the real world (as Plato many times seemed wont to do, what with his idealistic beliefs). So since beauty is a subjective thing, and beauty is a reflection of the world of forms, I believe that each and every person has their own "world of forms." Essentially, I'm saying that at least beauty, and I think some other things but I will not get into those at this moment, is subjective and that from this I conclude that there is not singular world of forms as Plato describes it.
At least I think that's what I'm saying.
Wednesday, November 4, 2009
Sunday, November 1, 2009
Aquinas' Fifth Way
St. Thomas Aquinas had five proofs for the existence of God (and by God he means a full Judeochristian, omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient God). They all reside in his Summa Theologica in the first book if you're interested in reading all of them. Today I will explain the fifth and hopefully refute it as a proof for the full Judeochristian God.
His fifth way is very similar to Intelligent Design but not quite. Rather than saying that everything is so orderly, he instead shows that everything in the universe acts toward an end, i.e., everything in the universe has some sort of purpose that it pursues. For example, trees grow and attempt to populate and eat sunshine, etc., while mushrooms eat dead trees and grow and try to spread their fungus, etc. His argument then proceeds to the point that unintelligent things (such as trees and mushrooms) cannot possibly acts toward an end without being guided by something, for that is the definition of unintelligent things: they have no thoughts to guide them toward a purpose. Thus, Aquinas says, there must be some intelligent being that guides these things toward an end, and this being must be God.
First, I ask this question: what is the definition of a tree? or What does it mean for something to be a tree? This is not it exactly, but something generally along the lines of a plant that grows extremely tall, eats sunshine, attempts to populate, etc. So it is thus in the definition of being a tree that it has an end; if it did not have these ends or purposes, it would not be called a tree. Aquinas argue that is has these ends only if given it by something intelligent, rather than having been created by chance or happenstance. This idea of chance is something he doesn't really ever get into, so I'll just ignore it for now and assume that he's correct that it can only be done by design by an intelligent being.
So now I ask this: Why does this thing, this being that created trees have to be a omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and all loving? To me, it only gives us, if you accept that it was created by design, a being that is more powerful than humans are, a being that can create things on a whim, possibly from nothing. I see no reason to ascribe to this being the attributes of a Judeochristian God, but rather only a god, i.e., a being that is more powerful than humans are. It can certainly be intelligent, if you agree with Aquinas that you need an intelligent designer. However, I simply cannot see how it necessitates a full, Judeochristian concept of God.
His fifth way is very similar to Intelligent Design but not quite. Rather than saying that everything is so orderly, he instead shows that everything in the universe acts toward an end, i.e., everything in the universe has some sort of purpose that it pursues. For example, trees grow and attempt to populate and eat sunshine, etc., while mushrooms eat dead trees and grow and try to spread their fungus, etc. His argument then proceeds to the point that unintelligent things (such as trees and mushrooms) cannot possibly acts toward an end without being guided by something, for that is the definition of unintelligent things: they have no thoughts to guide them toward a purpose. Thus, Aquinas says, there must be some intelligent being that guides these things toward an end, and this being must be God.
First, I ask this question: what is the definition of a tree? or What does it mean for something to be a tree? This is not it exactly, but something generally along the lines of a plant that grows extremely tall, eats sunshine, attempts to populate, etc. So it is thus in the definition of being a tree that it has an end; if it did not have these ends or purposes, it would not be called a tree. Aquinas argue that is has these ends only if given it by something intelligent, rather than having been created by chance or happenstance. This idea of chance is something he doesn't really ever get into, so I'll just ignore it for now and assume that he's correct that it can only be done by design by an intelligent being.
So now I ask this: Why does this thing, this being that created trees have to be a omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and all loving? To me, it only gives us, if you accept that it was created by design, a being that is more powerful than humans are, a being that can create things on a whim, possibly from nothing. I see no reason to ascribe to this being the attributes of a Judeochristian God, but rather only a god, i.e., a being that is more powerful than humans are. It can certainly be intelligent, if you agree with Aquinas that you need an intelligent designer. However, I simply cannot see how it necessitates a full, Judeochristian concept of God.
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