The Mere Addition Paradox

I looked through Parfit some, and the only objection I can possibly see is the Mere Addition Paradox, but I avoid this by having something akin to Kavka's "Bad Level" which Parfit explains. This "Bad Level" example has its own problems, mainly that it forces the theorist once again to the Repugnant Conclusion. (If you do not know what this is, check out http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/repugnant-conclusion/. It has a nice succinct summary of it with a few attempts at getting around it.) However, I avoid this conclusion with my prioritization of peak value rather than an averagist or totalistic approach. So as far as I can see, Parfit has nothing to say against my theory, at least, nothing from his book Reason and Persons (Oxford University Press, 1984).