A Modern Elitism, part 2

Yesterday I attempted to explain peak value. Today I'm going to discuss an issue with value theories that have peak value as their primary concern.

Because only peak value matters, all of the other values are disregarded. This is rather problematic. Imagine two worlds. The first world has two populations, both of which have a wellbeing value of 10. The second world has two populations, one of which has a value of 11 and the other of which has a value of -1x10^200. According to peak value theory, this second world is better since there is a higher peak value. This is a very bad result, as no ethical theorist wants to say that a world in which some population has a wellbeing value that is extremely negative (with anything below 0 being a life not worth living or at least a life that is lived in utter suffering) is better than a world in which both populations have an equally high wellbeing that is positive.

My hope is that I can get around this by somehow combining peak value theory and totalistic value theory. I have yet to come up with the solution, but tomorrow I will put down a few ideas I have.